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Abstract
Despite the empirical relevance of advertising strategies in concentrated mar-
kets, the economics literature is largely silent on the eect of persuasive advertising
strategies on pricing, market structure and increasing (or decreasing) dominance.
In a simple model of persuasive advertising and pricing with dierentiated goods,
we analyze the interdependencies between ex-ante asymmetries in consumer ap-
peal, advertising and prices. Products with larger initial appeal to consumers will
be advertised more heavily but priced at a higher level - that is, advertising and
price discounts are strategic substitutes for products with asymmetric initial ap-
peal. We nd that the escalating eect of advertising dominates the moderating
eect of pricing so that post-competition market shares are more asymmetric than
pre-competition dierences in consumer appeal. We further nd that collusive ad-
vertising (but competitive pricing) generates the same market outcomes, and that
network eects lead to even more extreme market outcomes, both directly and via
the eect on advertising.
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1 Introduction
Advertising investments represent one of the largest items in companies' nancial budgets.
It is estimated that advertising expenditure accounts for 1 percent of GDP worldwide and
3 percent of GDP in developed countries (AdSpend Growth in 2006, ZenithOptimedia).
In the U.S. alone, rms spend US$ 150 billion on advertising-related services. For prod-
ucts as diverse as cosmetics, beer or consumer electronics, more than 20 percent of the
prot margins are regularly re-invested in advertising-related activities (see Advertising
to Margin Ratios 2008, Schonfeld & Associates).
The economics literature distinguishes between two main eects of advertising. First,
advertising can create demand by informing consumers about existence, price and at-
tributes of the product (Butters, 1977). It can also signal quality (Nelson, 1974), cost
advantages (Linnemer, 1998) or economies of scale (Bagwell and Ramey, 1994; Clark and
Horstmann, 2005). Following the informative view therefore, advertising carries infor-
mation for potential consumers that will lead to purchases, thus increasing demand for
an advertised product. Second, advertising can also change consumers' perceptions and
preferences about the product and introduces a further source of (spurious) product dif-
ferentiation (Dixit and Norman, 1978). The persuasive view on advertising thus argues
that consumers' willingness to pay for a product is aected directly by the amount of
advertising for it.
Although persuasive techniques such as celebrity endorsements or emotional appeal are
a generic part of the marketer's everyday tool kit, the persuasive function of advertising
is only slowly acknowledged in economic models of advertising competition.1 Thus, the
economic literature has been largely silent on many problems in concentrated advertising-
intensive industries. Particularly, the eect of persuasive advertising on price competition
and the resulting market structure is not yet fully understood.
This is especially surprising given the literature's existing focus on rm investment in-
centives in asymmetric market structures. In addition to the extensive (mostly empirical)
literature on innovation incentives and market structure (Aghion et al., 2005; Kretschmer
et al., 2009), research on increasing dominance studies markets in which ongoing invest-
ments by competing rms can serve to reinforce or weaken initial asymmetries in market
structure. Such investments may involve setting low prices (Cabral and Riordan, 1994)
or investing in high quality or low cost (Athey and Schmutzler, 2001), while additional
sources of increasing dominance can be R&D risk choice (Cabral, 2002) or network eects
(Arthur, 1989), among others. However, despite the obvious empirical relevance, the role
of advertising has not been considered in such models.
Clearly, advertising is just one of many strategic variables rms choose when com-
peting. Firms will run advertising campaigns with a clear expectation of their impact
1Bagwell (2007) gives a thorough overview over the theoretical and empirical literature on advertising.
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on the pricing strategies they intend to use later on, and they will take product design
outcomes from an earlier stage into account when deciding on advertising. In this paper,
we propose a simple model of persuasive advertising and pricing with dierentiated goods
a la Hotelling (1929) and focus especially on the interdependencies between the outcome
of the product design process and competition in advertising and prices. We nd that dif-
ferences originating from more or less successful product design will be amplied by rm
advertising but reduced by pricing. In other words, products with larger initial appeal
to consumers will be advertised more heavily while priced at a higher level - advertising
and price discounts are strategic substitutes for products with asymmetric initial appeal
to consumers. We nd that the escalating eect of advertising dominates the moderating
eect of pricing so that post-competition market shares are more asymmetric than the
initial appeal to consumers given equal prices and advertising.2 This is because the ini-
tially advantaged rm can charge higher prices ceteris paribus, so that it potentially gains
more from an expansion of its customer base and thus has a greater incentive to advertise
than its smaller rival. In a series of extensions, we nd that collusive advertising (but
competitive pricing) generates the same market outcomes, and that network eects lead
to even more extreme market outcomes, both directly and via the eect on advertising.
Our work relates to models of persuasive advertising in a Hotelling setup without al-
lowing for rm asymmetry. Von der Fehr and Stevik (1998) develop a framework for the
classication of possible advertising technologies in such models. They distinguish three
ways how persuasive advertising may aect demand: i) It may increase the willingness
to pay, ii) increase perceived product dierences or iii) change the ideal product variety.
Ordo~nez de Haro (1993), in a setup modeling option i), studies persuasive advertising as
an entry barrier and nds that advertising will be employed excessively in equilibrium
compared to the social optimum. Including ours, other research on persuasive advertising
concentrated on changes in consumer preferences. Von der Fehr and Stevik (1998) con-
clude for this case that advertising will not aect prices and sales as the rms' advertising
expenditures will be balanced in equilibrium. This result is due to the fact that they only
consider symmetric rms (and employ an advertising technology similar to ours). Bloch
and Manceau (1999) show that the degree of product dierentiation - and thus the com-
petitiveness of the market at the pricing stage - may decrease or increase when advertising
alters the shape of the distribution of consumers' preferences on the Hotelling interval.
They consider a general functional form which limits possible conclusions about rms' ad-
vertising incentives. In contrast, our parametrization of the advertising technology allows
for a richer analysis of the advertising game while inevitably losing out on generalizabil-
ity. Stressing the combative (i.e. business-stealing) aspect of persuasive advertising in a
Hotelling model, Chen et al. (2009) consider the eect of advertising on the size of the
2Note that we think of increasing dominance in the sense of comparing post-investment to pre-
investment market asymmetry rather than in a dynamic game.
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respective segments of `indierent' and `partisan' consumers in the pricing game. They
nd that if the initial distribution of preferences and the responsiveness to advertising
are such that advertising increases the segment of partisan consumers who strongly favor
one rm, competition in prices will soften. Conversely, if receiving advertisements from
both rms creates a large segment of indierent consumers, price competition will inten-
sify. However, while studying the overall competitive eects with a exible preference
structure, the authors do not consider eects of persuasive advertising on the relative
competitive positions of rms.
The only other work to our knowledge that allows for asymmetric market shares
with persuasive advertising is by Doraszelski and Markovich (2007). In their model of a
dynamic oligopoly market, rms build up goodwill that makes consumers more inclined
to buy a certain brand. Their question is similar to ours in that they investigate the
persistence and dynamics of initial advantages. However, the papers dier substantially
with respect to the function of persuasive advertising they study: Goodwill advertising
is more consistent with long-term investments in branding while our model concentrates
on forms of advertising that take immediate eect on consumer preferences. Thus, where
Doraszelski and Markovich consider the long-run eects of interaction in advertising and
prices, we complement their work by looking at the implications of a setup equivalent to a
one-shot product-specic campaign. This specication models a situation when decisions
at the product design stage (still) strongly aect the demand of a newly introduced
product. Despite these dierences, the main nding of persuasive advertising as a force of
increasing dominance is the same in both papers. However, while in their model a larger
market and lower advertising costs have a deescalating eect, we nd the exact opposite.
The reason for this discrepancy is that in their model advertising has both market-share
and market-size eects while we focus on the combative nature of advertising competition.
Thus, in their model, the smaller rm may grow on market expansion and sidestep the
competitive confrontation with the larger rival.
The way in which initial market share asymmetries enter the model is inspired by Grilo
et al. (2001), who build their analysis of price competition with positive and negative
network eects around the idea of locational advantage in a Hotelling model.
In our model, advertising is a costly device for location choices. Therefore, this work
also relates to the literature on the choice of location in Hotelling models (e.g., Osborne
and Pitchik, 1987; Anderson et al., 1997; Brekke et al., 2006; for a review see Anderson
et al., 1992, Ch. 8). However, in contrast to models where rms choose location directly,
in our model the distance between rms is xed and the rms' locations are determined
by the relative magnitudes of advertising by competing rms. We interpret advertising
as an instrument for reacting to mistakes made in the product development phase due to
uncertainty.
Our model can also be interpreted as one stage of a repeated market game in which
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rms make myopic (and uncertain) decisions on product design and subsequently choose
advertising and pricing jointly and competitively. The initial asymmetry is then a result
from prior iterations while the outcome forms the starting point for a new interaction.3 As
mentioned above, our work therefore also relates to the literature on increasing dominance
(e.g., Cabral and Riordan, 1994; Athey and Schmutzler, 2001). In addition, our extension
with network eects provides a new framework to study how dierent forces of increasing
dominance interact. Given the concerns about inecient market outcomes when network
eects are present (e.g., Arthur, 1989; Besen and Farrell, 1994; Katz and Shapiro, 1994),
studying the relative importance of network eects compared to strategies like advertising,
quality and prices for competitive outcomes is an important task. Tellis et al. (2008) take
a step in this direction by investigating the relative importance of quality and network
eects for market dominance. They nd that high quality was the most important driver of
market success in the industries considered while the presence of network eects enhanced
the quality eect. Our results suggest a similar relationship for advertising and network
eects.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
basic model. After that, we investigate the robustness of our results with two extensions.
The implications and limitations of the results are discussed in the conclusion.
2 The Model
Our model is based on a Hotelling model of product dierentiation: Two rms produce
goods 0 and 1, which may dier in one dimension of their (exogenous) characteristics,4
with constant marginal costs (normalized to 0). The dierence in characteristics is given
by their locations on the Hotelling line, x0 2 [0; 1] and x1 2 [0; 1]. Without loss of
generality we assume x0  x1, that is, good 0 is located left of good 1.
Consumers have unit demand and are uniformly distributed with mass N on the
interval [0; 1]. A consumer j's position j on the line gives her idiosyncratic preference
for product characteristics. When buying product i (i = 0; 1), she bears `transport costs'
 ( > 0) multiplied by the squared distance between her own location and the location
of the good she buys.5
Firms can advertise to alter consumers' perceptions about the ideal brand. More pre-
cisely, by investing in advertising they can shift the distribution of consumers horizontally
so that after observing advertisements consumer j decides as if his position was not j but
3Note that we do not focus on the source of ex ante asymmetry, which could be due to luck, uncertain
product innovation, or unknown consumer preferences. Instead, we focus on the eects such asymmetries
have on competition in advertising and prices.
4We assume that rms cannot alter the fundamental product characteristics and take the ex ante
location of the products as exogenous to concentrate on advertising and pricing decisions. For the choice
of location see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992).
5Quadratic transport costs ensure equilibrium existence in the pricing game (d'Aspremont et al., 1979).
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j   g(a0; a1) with g(a0; a1) = (a0   a1). This advertising technology has the following
properties:6
 The sign of g() depends on the relative size of a0 and a1:
g(a0; a1) > 0 for a0 > a1, g(a0; a1) < 0 for a0 < a1,
and g(a0; a1) = 0 for a0 = a1:
 g() increases in a0 and decreases in a1:
@g(a0;a1)
@a0
> 0, @g(a0;a1)
@a1
< 0:
 g() is symmetric in a0 and a1:
g(a; a) =  g(a; a) with a; a 2 R+ .
An important feature of our advertising technology is that rms cannot alter the distri-
bution of consumers but only the position of the consumers' interval on the Hotelling line.
Advertising thus does not lead to clustering of consumers around the advertised product
but draws all of them towards one of the extremes of product space while maintaining a
uniform distribution, so that the degree of consumer and rm heterogeneity is xed.
The intuition for our advertising function is the following: Success in the advertising
game means that consumers are convinced of the superiority of one brand's position over
the other's for given prices. As we rule out targeting certain consumers, advertising shifts
everyone's preferences, which is analogous to an increase in the reservation value for one
product for all consumers. Consider the example of detergents dierentiated along a
Hotelling line capturing their `gentleness'. A brand that is located closer (but not at)
to the `hard' (but eective) end of the line than its rival will advertise the benets of
eectiveness in general rather than the virtues of `2/3 hard, 1/3 gentle'. This untargeted
advertising message eventually leads to all consumers preferring more eective detergents,
i.e. the Hotelling line shifts towards the `hard' end.
The eect of advertising on consumers' decision making is mediated through the trans-
port costs: Consumer j's post-advertising transport costs are (j (a0 a1) xi)2 instead
of (j   xi)2. Transport costs thus increase for the rm that advertises less. By using
persuasive advertising rms can thus try to make their rival's brand less attractive ceteris
paribus while at the same time enhancing the attractiveness of their own without altering
fundamental product characteristics.
Advertising is costly for rms and displays decreasing returns (Simon and Arndt,
1980). We model this by assuming quadratic advertising costs with a scaling parameter
i > 0:
C(ai) = i  a2i ; i = 0; 1:
6With these properties, our advertising function is an application of the general functional form
considered by von der Fehr and Stevik (1998) for advertising that changes the ideal product variety.
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In our basic model, we assume that rms use the same advertising technology with equal
costs so that 0 = 1 = . The case of asymmetric costs will be discussed in the Appendix.
We now take a closer look at the consumer side of the model. Net surplus for a
consumer j with position j when buying from rm i (i = 0; 1) is
Ui(j) = V     (j   (a0   a1)  xi)2   pi; (1)
where V is the consumer's gross valuation and pi the price for good i. Assume that V is
large enough so that the market is always covered.
At this point it is useful to introduce the idea of locational advantage which helps us
organize the discussion later on.
Denition 1. If x0 + x1 > (<) 1, rm 0 (1) has an initial locational advantage.
The intuition of the locational advantage is the following: For x0 + x1 > 1, good 0
lies closer than good 1 to the position of the median consumer  = 1
2
so that consumers'
maximum travel distances are shorter for product 0. As a result, under a hypothetical
assumption of equal prices and advertising, rm 0 would attract more consumers than rm
1. Consequently, in this case, rm 0 enters the game with an advantage. The analogous
reasoning applies to rm 1 for x0 + x1 < 1. If the sum of the rms' positions x0 and x1
equals 1, goods are symmetrically located.
The initial locational advantage can originate from several sources. The most straight-
forward intuition would be that the rm with the locational advantage was more successful
in designing the product to the median consumer's needs under uncertainty than its rival
at a stage (not modeled here) prior to the game. This is not unrealistic as future demand
is often hard to anticipate (e.g., Bayus, 1993; Krishnan and Bhattacharya, 2002). Alter-
natively, the advantage may stem from earlier iterations of the market game where one
rm was able to build up goodwill with consumers (Doraszelski and Markovich, 2007).
Our static setting can then be interpreted as a snapshot of a dynamic game with myopic
rms.
The market game has three stages and is solved through backward induction. At the
rst stage, rms decide on advertising budgets a0; a1  0. Advertising costs are then
sunk in the second stage, when rms choose price levels p0 and p1. At the third stage,
consumers each select one of the products to buy after observing advertisements and
prices.
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3 Market Equilibrium
3.1 Third Stage: Consumer Choice
Equilibrium quantities corresponding to values of (p0; p1) and (a0; a1) at the third stage
can be found by determining the indierent consumer at ^ 2 [0; 1]. Solving U0 = U1 for
the indierent consumer's position yields
^ =
1
2
p1   p0 + (x1   x0)(x0 + x1 + 2(a0   a1))
(x1   x0) : (2)
All consumers located on the interval [^; 1] buy product 1 while consumers located on [0; ^]
buy product 0. An increase in p1 (p0) shifts the position of the indierent consumer closer
towards the right (left) end of the line, thus increasing demand for rm 0 (1). Equation
(2) also shows that demand increases with own advertising and decreases with advertising
for the rival's product.
With market size N , quantities demanded for given price and advertising levels are
N  ^ for rm 0 and N  (1  ^) for rm 1. Note that for ^ 2 [0; 1] we require:
(x1   x0)(x0 + x1 + 2(a0   a1)) < p0   p1
<  (x1   x0)(2   x0   x1   2(a0   a1)): (3)
Inequality (3) species combinations of advertising and price strategies for which rms
share the market and market shares are determined by (2). Outside this area, one single
rm captures the entire market.
3.2 Second Stage: Firms' Pricing Decisions
Having identied the behavior of consumers at the third stage of the game, we now
turn to the pricing subgame at the second stage. We assume that at the time of the
pricing decision advertising decisions have already come into eect and are observed by all
agents. Consequently, advertising costs are sunk when prices are set. Firm i's optimization
problem at the second stage becomes thus
max
pi
pi  ni(a0; a1; p0; p1);
where ni is the respective demand with n0 = N  ^ and n1 = N  (1  ^).
Maximizing prot for given advertising levels under the assumption of market sharing
and solving the resulting reaction functions yields prices
p0(a0; a1) =

3
(x1   x0)(2 + x0 + x1 + 2(a0   a1)) (4)
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and
p1(a0; a1) =

3
(x1   x0)(4  x0   x1   2(a0   a1)): (5)
Equations (4) and (5) allow for several observations. Firstly, prices increase in own ad-
vertising and decrease in the advertising of the rival. Advertising and prices are thus
complementary market strategies on the one hand and strategic substitutes in the market
game on the other hand.7 This is in line with the empirical results of Slade (1995), who
nds that when advertising is combative, advertising and prices are strategic substitutes.
Further, our model reproduces the standard result that prices are positively correlated
both with the degree of product dierentiation measured by the product of the transport
cost parameter  and the distance between product locations (x1   x0). That is, when
transport costs are relatively high or products very dissimilar, the intensity of competition
between rms is low. In this case, the market will have higher overall price levels. Note
that changes in the transport cost parameter  aect the absolute competitive situation
(i.e. intensity) in the pricing game while advertising aects the relative competitive
situation.
Comparing (4) and (5) shows that the rm with the stronger relative position after
advertising can charge a price premium. In particular, if x0 + x1 + 2(a0   a1) > 1,
rm 0 charges a higher price than rm 1. Analogously, rm 1 charges a premium if
x0 + x1 + 2(a0   a1) < 1. Note the strong resemblance of these expressions to the
concept of locational advantage introduced earlier. We can hence rephrase our result in
the following way:
Remark 1. The rm with a post-advertising locational advantage charges a price pre-
mium over its rival.
3.3 First Stage: Firms' Advertising Decisions
At the rst stage, rms maximize prot taking into account advertising costs C(ai) as well
as subsequent decisions. In particular, rm i chooses its advertising level ai to maximize
i = p

i (ai; aj)  ni(pi (ai; aj); pj(ai; aj); ai; aj)    a2i :
Solving the reaction functions we obtain for the interior equilibrium advertising strate-
gies
a0 =
N(x1   x0)
3
 3(2 + x0 + x1)  4
2N(x1   x0)
9  42N(x1   x0) (6)
7Note that because of these features this game does not belong to the class of supermodular games
studied by Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Vives (1990) and Tremblay (2004).
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and
a1 =
N(x1   x0)
3
 3(4  x0   x1)  4
2N(x1   x0)
9  42N(x1   x0) : (7)
Note how when rms are symmetrically located, these equations boil down to a0 = a

1 =
N(x1 x0)
3
. In other words, symmetrically located rms advertise the same so that sym-
metric market shares will persist.8. For asymmetric locations, conclusions from equations
(6) and (7) hinge on the respective second term of the right hand side. We will make the
following assumption throughout this section:
Assumption 1. Advertising costs  are not too low:
 >
4
9
2N(x1   x0):
Assumption 1 states that advertising is suciently costly in relation to its eectiveness
. It ensures that rms have to make a signicant investment to be able to prot from
a change in consumers' preferences. The inequality becomes stronger for larger markets
(N) and higher degrees of product dierentiation () indicating that the restriction on
minimum advertising costs becomes more stringent with higher prot opportunities.
With Assumption 1 we can conclude from (6) and (7) that rm 0 advertises more than
rm 1 if it has a locational advantage (x0 + x1 > 1), and less if x0 + x1 < 1. As a result,
consumer preferences are drawn further towards the characteristics of the already leading
product which amplies the market asymmetry.
3.4 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
We now complete our solution for an interior subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
Inserting (6) and (7) in equations (4) and (5), we obtain equilibrium price levels
p0 = (x1   x0)
3(2 + x0 + x1)  42N(x1   x0)
9  42N(x1   x0) (8)
and
p1 = (x1   x0)
3(4  x0   x1)  42N(x1   x0)
9  42N(x1   x0) : (9)
As above, a symmetric location of rms yields symmetric price strategies, p0 = p

1 =
(x1 x0). For asymmetric locations, the rm with an initial locational advantage charges
more than the price for symmetric locations while the rm with an initial disadvantage
charges less. Hence, a rm with an initial disadvantage will concentrate on competitive
pricing instead of trying to oset its position with large advertising eorts.
8Note that prots do not fall to zero as products are still dierentiated unless x0 = x1 =
1
2
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Substituting a0, a

1, p

0 and p

1 into (2) yields the position of the indierent consumer:
^ =
1
2
3(2 + x0 + x1)  42N(x1   x0)
9  42N(x1   x0) : (10)
When rm 0 has an initial locational advantage, ^ is located on the right side of the
median consumer at  = 1=2 while it is located on his left side for an initial advantage
of rm 1. The initially leading rm can thus translate its locational advantage into a
higher equilibrium market share. The disadvantaged rm's lower price cannot compensate
for the (advertising-enhanced) asymmetry in consumer preferences. The asymmetry in
equilibrium market shares is more pronounced for larger markets and higher transport
costs, indicating that higher prot opportunities benet the initially leading rm most:
@^
@N
> (<) 0 and
@^
@
> (<) 0 if x0 + x1 > (<) 1:
At the same time, advertising costs and the market share of the initially leading rm are
inversely related:
@^
@
< (>) 0 if x0 + x1 > (<) 1:
Capturing market share hence becomes easier for the leading rm when advertising costs
decrease. In other words, a negative shock in the costs for advertisements, for example
during an economic recession, increases asymmetries in market shares ceteris paribus and
may thus facilitate monopolization.
For a0; a

1; p

0; p

1 and ^
 to form an equilibrium they need to lie in their domain of
denition, that is a0; a

1  0, p0; p1  0 and 0  ^  1. This is true if
 >
4
3 minf2 + x0 + x1; 4  x0   x1g
2N(x1   x0): (11)
The set determined by condition (11) is feasible under Assumption 1. Hence, as long as
this inequality holds, equations (6)-(10) describe an interior subgame perfect equilibrium
of the game. Our rst proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 1a. The rm with an initial locational advantage advertises more than its
rival while the disadvantaged rm charges a lower price. The rm with the initial advan-
tage captures a larger share of the market.
The advantage of the leading rm in the advertising game goes back to the way
advertising and prices enter the prot functions. While prices are strategic complements,
investments in advertising are strategic substitutes. Thus, the positive eect of advertising
expenditure on own prots decreases with the amount spent by the other rm. This is
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in line with the results by Athey and Schmutzler (2001) who see the characteristic of
strategic substitutes as one of the key conditions for increasing dominance.9 In addition,
the rm with the initial advantage will have a higher equilibrium margin than its rival
because it can charge higher prices ceteris paribus due to its captive consumers. Since
marginal costs of advertising are the same for both rms, the incentive to advertise is
smaller for the initially disadvantaged rm.10 The strategic advantage from the product
design stage thus follows from considerations of cost and benet of advertising.
We can also characterize what happens in corner solutions when (11) does not hold.
In this case, a0; a

1; p

0 and p

1 are no longer equilibrium strategies as at least one would be
negative. Instead, one of the rms captures the entire market.
Let us rst consider the case of x0 + x1 > 1 where rm 0 has an initial locational ad-
vantage. With Assumption 1 and equation (11), the critical parameter range is identied
by
4
9
2N(x1   x0) <  < 4
3  (4  x0   x1)
2N(x1   x0):
If this range is non-empty, the following outcome forms an equilibrium: At the third stage,
all consumers buy from rm 0 and rm 1 leaves the market. Firm 0 charges the maximum
price leading to monopolization as restricted by equation (3) while the advertising level is
the prot maximizing investment for this price. The resulting equilibrium strategies are
p0 = (x1   x0)
22N(x1   x0)  (2  x0   x1)

; p1 = 0;
a0 =
N(x1   x0)

and a1 = 0:
(12)
The intuition behind this result is that in the extreme cases where (11) does not hold,
advertising is so cheap that the initially advantaged rm can corner the market through
advertising. In this case, the rival rm cannot cut its prices further to attract consumers
and must exit the market.
Note that this pressure from the leading rm on its competitor results from advertising,
not erce pricing. The ability of market cornering denotes an important dierence between
the eects of persuasive advertising and mere price cuts. In a setup without advertising,
rms would always share the market. Only the introduction of the second strategic
variable allows for monopolization through the leading rm.
Analogously, rm 1 may capture the market when it has a locational advantage and
9Note that we obtain increasing dominance although their other prerequisite, increasing returns to
the investment, is not met.
10The incentive may be higher when the overall market size increases due to advertising (Doraszelski
and Markovich, 2007).
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advertising is not too costly:
4
9
2N(x1   x0) <  < 4
3  (2 + x0 + x1)
2N(x1   x0):
Equilibrium strategies are then given by
p0 = 0; p

1 = (x1   x0)
22N(x1   x0)  (x0 + x1)

;
a0 = 0 and a

1 =
N(x1   x0)

:
(13)
The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 1b. For suciently low advertising costs, the ex-ante advantaged rm cap-
tures the entire market.
The fact that advertising can produce monopoly outcomes has important implications
for product introduction and marketing. Assuming that the initial disadvantage stems
from poor design at the product development stage, it shows that precisely when adver-
tising is cheap, initial mistakes cannot be redressed through marketing eorts but may
result in total failure. While this may seem counterintuitive at rst glance, it becomes
clearer when considering that the rival rm has access to the same cheap technology and
can counteract all eorts from a more convenient position charging higher prices.
0.70.60.50.40.30.20.10.0
0.4
0.3
(1)
(3)
(2)
0.2
0.1
0.0

x0
Figure 1: The eect of locational advantage and advertising costs on monopoly outcomes
(x1 = 0:75, N = 1,  = 1,  = 0:8).
13
We illustrate the impact of advertising costs and locational asymmetry on monopo-
lization graphically. Figure 1 exhibits areas of dierent market outcomes for one specic
parametrization and combinations of advertising costs and location. The horizontal axis
displays the location of rm 0's product on the Hotelling line and is restricted by the po-
sition of rm 1's product at x1 = 0:75. The advertising cost parameter  is shown on the
vertical axis. For parameterizations in area (1) rms share the market. Monopolization
occurs in areas (2) where rm 1 captures the market and (3) where rm 0 squeezes out
its rival. Other parameterizations are excluded by Assumption 1.
3.5 Firms' Prot Levels
We consider now how our results translate into rms' prot levels. We rst look at the
relative prot level of rms. While the rm with a locational advantage benets from its
larger equilibrium market share and higher price, it also spends more on advertising than
its rival. An analysis of equilibrium prots, however, conrms that the revenue eect
dominates the cost eect so that a rm with an initial locational advantage earns higher
prots than its rival, as expected:
0 > (<)

1 if x0 + x1 > (<) 1:
A second aspect is how absolute prot levels are aected by the advertising technology.
0
 = 0:5
 = 0
 = 0:75
 = 1
Figure 2: Firm 0's equilibrium prot for dierent levels of advertising eectiveness (x1 =
0:75, N = 1,  = 0:3,  = 0:8).
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Figure 2 shows prot levels of rm 0 plotted against its location for dierent levels of
advertising eectiveness, .
 = 0 characterizes a world without an eective advertising technology. Prots
then decrease monotonically when the distance between products shrinks - the standard
Hotelling result. In this case, a maximum level of product dierentiation benets a rm
more than a locational advantage that goes along with a position closer to the other
rm. When advertising is eective, the shape of the prot function changes to an inverse
u-shape yielding highest prots in situations with intermediate degrees of product dier-
entiation, i.e. for positions implying a locational advantage. The intuition for this result
is that for intermediate degrees of product dierentiation a locational advantage helps
decide the advertising game in favor of the advantaged rm while consumers perceive the
rms as suciently dierent. When rms are located closer to each other, it becomes
harder to pull consumers away from the rival through advertising. We can also observe
that for the underlying parametrization feasible prot levels decline when advertising be-
comes more eective. The reason is that advertising spending tends to increase for larger
 resulting in the observed decline of overall prot levels. Even the leading rm may
need to make investments so substantial that they are not balanced by potential gains.
At the same time, it cannot forgo advertising as the rival rm would otherwise gain an
advantage. This classical prisoners' dilemma situation arises for most parameterizations
while for others at least the initially leading rm prots from advertising.11
4 Extensions
In this section, we discuss two extensions of our basic model and their implications for
equilibrium outcomes.
4.1 Semi-Collusive Advertising
For a signicant share of the parameter space, both rms would be better o if advertising
was not available, but are willing to use the opportunity in the battle for market share. For
symmetric rms, any investment in advertising at all is clearly wasted. We therefore reect
on how rms would act if they decided jointly on the implementation of advertising.12
Semi-collusion on advertising may be attractive for rms when, for instance, antitrust
authorities observe price levels more strictly than advertising levels.13
Collusion at the rst stage of the game does not inuence consumer and rm behav-
11Identifying the parameter ranges is not possible analytically. A numerical analysis is available from
the authors on request.
12The case of full collusion or un-contested monopoly can not be analyzed in this framework as the
assumption of full market coverage would imply the potential of unrestricted prots.
13See Wang et al. (2007) for empirical evidence on semi-collusion on advertising.
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ior for any advertising level at the second and third stage. Consumer behavior is thus
described by equation (2) while rms set prices at the second stage according to (4) and
(5). At the rst stage, rms maximize joint prot
coll = p0(a0; a1)  n0(p0(a0; a1); p1(a0; a1); a0; a1)
+ p1(a0; a1)  n1(p0(a0; a1); p1(a0; a1); a0; a1)     (a0 + a1)
with respect to advertising levels a0 and a1. Solving the rst order conditions for optimal
levels of advertising gives
a0 =
 2N(x1   x0)(1  x0   x1)
9  82N(x1   x0) (14)
and
a1 =
2N(x1   x0)(1  x0   x1)
9  82N(x1   x0) : (15)
Note that for symmetric locations, none of the rms advertises. For interpreting equations
(14) and (15), we require analogously to Assumption 1 that advertising costs do not lie
below a certain threshold:
Assumption 2. Advertising costs  are not too low:
 >
8
9
2N(x1   x0):
With this assumption, we can see that (14) and (15) yield negative advertising spend-
ing for the product that is initially disadvantaged. However, since advertising levels are
restricted to the non-negative space, the rst best solution is not feasible. Accordingly,
rms will set advertising for the disadvantaged product equal to 0. Assume without loss
of generality that rm 0 is the rm that is initially disadvantaged. We thus have
a;coll0 = 0: (16)
Substituting this back into the prot maximization problem yields
a;coll1 =
2N(x1   x0)(1  x0   x1)
9  42N(x1   x0) (17)
for optimal advertising spending for product 1. Comparison with equations (6) and (7)
shows that the dierence between advertising spending for the two products is the same,
whether rms collude or compete at the third stage. As a result, the shift of the consumer
interval is the same as well. Consequently, when rms set advertising collusively but
compete in prices, the competitive results about market shares and prices are reproduced:
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In the case of semi-collusion, the rm that advertises less in the competitive equilibrium
does not advertise at all, while the other rm reduces its investment by the same amount.
Market shares and prices are identical to the competitive case while prots for both rms
increase due to savings in advertising expenditure.14
It is interesting to compare this nding with results from d'Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) on Research Joint Ventures.15 In a two-stage model where rms rst choose R&D
spending levels that maximize joint prot and compete in prices afterwards, they nd
that rms invest more in the rst stage the higher the spillovers from R&D investment.
The rst stage then sees increased quantities on the product market and thus lower
prices than in the fully competitive case while prots are higher. Our result thus fol-
lows from the assumption of no spillovers generated from advertising spending (i.e. pure
business-stealing). In such cases,the colluding rms refrain from duplicating advertising
investments and settle on the prot maximizing division of the market.
4.2 Network Eects
Demand-side externalities or network eects are a common feature especially in high-
technology markets. (Arthur, 1989; Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). As the structure of
markets for products with network eects is often characterized by asymmetries and ex-
treme outcomes (Koski and Kretschmer, 2004), the starting point for strategic interactions
is related in many ways to our basic setup.
By introducing network eects to our model, we shed more light on how rms' adver-
tising decisions dier for goods with network eects compared to marketing traditional
products. While some authors (Brekke et al., 2006; Pastine and Pastine, 2002) considered
advertising functions uniquely applying to network markets, our setup lets us compare
the worlds with and without network eects directly.
We follow an approach similar to Grilo et al. (2001) to incorporate network eects
in our basic model with symmetric costs: Two incompatible networks are formed by the
clients of the rms where each client prots from the size of the network he belongs to.
This eect may be due to, e.g., an enhanced availability of complementary products or
direct opportunities for interaction. Each consumer demands at most one unit of the good
so that he has to decide which network to join exclusively. The network eect adding to
his utility function when buying good i (i = 0; 1) follows the existing literature and is
dened as   ni where   0 and ni indicates the total number of buyers of good i.
14Note, however, that the collusive advertising levels do not form a Nash equilibrium as unilateral
deviation would raise the rm's prot.
15Compared to advertising, the question of semi-collusion has been more extensively studied in the
literature on R&D, see e.g., Kamien et al. (1992), Cabral (2000), and Lambertini et al. (2002).
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Net surplus for a consumer j with position j buying from rm i (i = 0; 1) is
Ui(j) = V     (j   xi   (a0   a1))2 + ni   pi: (18)
With network eects dierent partitions of consumers (n0; n1) can arise for equilibrium
values of (p0; p1) and (a0; a1) at the third stage. For determining the corresponding equi-
librium quantities, we need to identify the consumer for whom U0 = U1. Then, for
consumers' expectations about network size to be fullled in equilibrium the following
conditions must hold (Grilo et al., 2001):
n0 = ^N and n1 = (1  ^)N:
Solving U0 = U1 for the position of the indierent consumer ^ yields
^ =
1
2
p1   p0 + (x1   x0)(x0 + x1 + 2(a0   a1))  N
(x1   x0)  N : (19)
Through what follows we will concentrate on network eects that are not too strong
compared to the product dierentiation parameter, so that
(x1   x0)  N > 0: (20)
This assumption rules out equilibria with upward-sloping demand that yield multiple
subgame perfect equilibria.16
Solving the extended game through backward-induction yields equilibrium strategies:
a0 =
N(x1   x0)
3
 3 [(2 + x0 + x1)(x1   x0)  3N ]  4
2N 2(x1   x0)2
9((x1   x0)  N)  42N 2(x1   x0)2 (21)
and
a1 =
N(x1   x0)
3
 3 [(4  x0   x1)(x1   x0)  3N ]  4
2N 2(x1   x0)2
9((x1   x0)  N)  42N 2(x1   x0)2 ; (22)
p0 = ((x1  x0)  N)
3 [(2 + x0 + x1)(x1   x0)  3N ]  42N 2(x1   x0)2
9((x1   x0)  N)  42N 2(x1   x0)2 (23)
and
p1 = ((x1 x0) N)
3 [(4  x0   x1)(x1   x0)  3N ]  42N 2(x1   x0)2
9((x1   x0)  N)  42N 2(x1   x0)2 : (24)
When rms are symmetrically located, equations (21) and (22) boil down to a0 = a

1 =
N(x1 x0)
3
, which is identical to the case without network eects. Advertising decisions
16For a discussion of upward-sloping demand in a Hotelling model see Grilo et al. (2001).
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hence are only aected by network externalities when the market is characterized by an
initial asymmetry. Note that, in contrast, price strategies always depend negatively on
the size of the network externality as an additional consumer carries the added benet of
a larger network size.
Analogous to the other specications, we require advertising costs to lie above a certain
threshold:
Assumption 3. Advertising costs are not too low:
 >
4
9  ((x1   x0)  N)
2N 2(x1   x0)2:
We can infer from equations (21) and (22) that the rm with the initial advantage
makes a larger investment in advertising while the disadvantaged rm charges a lower
price. we now study how network eects interact with the locational advantage. It can
be shown that the inuence of the network eect on equilibrium advertising spending
depends on the initial asymmetry between rms:
@a0
@
> (<) 0 and
@a1
@
< (>) 0 if x0 + x1 > (<) 1:
Network eects thus escalate the dierence between advertising spending of the two rms.
In other words, the escalating forces of advertising and network eects do not work in-
dependently but interact with each other. The inuence of network eects on the price
dierential, on the other hand, is ambiguous and depends on the parametrization. How-
ever, the insight from the basic model that the initially advantaged rm charges a higher
price than its rival is also valid in the presence of network eects.
The position of the indierent consumer can be derived as
^ =
1
2
3 [(2 + x0 + x1)(x1   x0)  3N ]  42N 2(x1   x0)2
9((x1   x0)  N)  42N 2(x1   x0)2 : (25)
Inspection shows that the market share of the initially advantaged rm will always be
higher than its rival's. As in the basic setup, the products' dierence with respect to their
appeal to consumers cannot be overcome by price cuts. Comparative statics show that
the existence of network eects deepens amplies the asymmetry of market outcomes by
shifting the indierent consumer further away from the center of the line:
@^
@
> (<) 0 if x0 + x1 > (<) 1:
Network eects thus lead to more extreme market outcomes where one rm dominates a
substantial part of the market.
The following proposition summarizes the results for the extension with network ef-
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fects:
Proposition 2. In interior equilibria, advertising spending increases (decreases) in net-
work eects for the rm with (without) the initial locational advantage. The market share
of the leading rm increases in network eects.
As in the basic setup, there are also parameter values for which the strategies given
above cannot form an equilibrium. In these cases, the initially advantaged rm may corner
the market. In particular, rm 0 can drive rm 1 out of the market if
 <
4
3  [(4  x0   x1)(x1   x0)  3N ]
2N 2(x1   x0)2: (26)
Note how the inequality becomes weaker for stronger network eects: As seen in the
comparative statics for ^, the existence of network eects facilitates extreme market
outcomes. At the same time, Assumption 1 is still required so that (26) is not always
feasible.
Equilibrium strategies for cases covered by (26) are
p0 = N   (x1   x0)
22N(x1   x0)  (2  x0   x1)

; p1 = 0;
a0 =
N(x1   x0)

and a1 = 0:
For the sake of completeness, we also identify the parameter range for which rm 1
captures the market when it has a locational advantage:
 <
4
3  [(2 + x0 + x1)(x1   x0)  3N ]
2N 2(x1   x0)2: (27)
In these cases, prices and advertising levels will be in equilibrium:
p0 = 0; p

1 = N   (x1   x0)
22N(x1   x0)  (x0 + x1)

;
a0 = 0 and a

1 =
N(x1   x0)

:
Figure 3 illustrates how network eects and locational advantage interact with regard
to market outcomes. Values on the horizontal axis represent rm 0's position on the
Hotelling line. The vertical axis shows the extent of the network eect. Area (1) indicates
parameterizations for which rms share the market while area (2) represents the space
where rm 0 captures the entire market. Parameterizations outside these spaces are
excluded by Assumption 3.
The Figure shows that rm 0 captures the market only if it has an initial locational
advantage (x0 > 0:25). Note that for this parametrization monopolization would never
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Figure 3: The eect of locational advantage and network eects on monopoly outcomes
(x1 = 0:75,  = 0:3, N = 1,  = 1,  = 0:8).
occur without network eects. As in the other specications of the model, the parameter
space with monopoly outcomes is largest for medium values of x0: When rm 0 is located
closer to rm 1 and its locational advantage increases, it may capture the market only for
small ranges of network eects. At the same time, the closer rm 0 is located to rm 1,
the lower are the critical values of network eects that yield monopolization. Note also
how the feasible parameter space shrinks for small distances between rms. Equilibrium
existence thus hinges signicantly on rms' distance in the case of network eects.
5 Discussion and Implications
Our model and its results have both theoretical and empirical implications. On a the-
oretical level, we nd that asymmetry in terms of products' initial appeal to consumers
can have important implications about the use and eect of specic strategic variables.
Specically, we nd that while advertising would not change market shares and relative
prots with symmetric rms, it amplies initial asymmetries in product design if there are
any. This result of increasing dominance is obtained without assuming dierences in the
eectiveness or cost associated with advertising. Further, standard sources for increasing
dominance like scale economies or nancial constraints are not necessary for this result.17
17Of course, our results on increasing dominance extend to other strategies designed to alter rms'
relative competitive positions, e.g. cost-reducing investments. For cost-reducing investments, however,
21
We also nd that rms choose dierent strategies for dierent strategic variables -
ex-ante advantaged rms will compete more aggressively in advertising, ex-ante disad-
vantaged rms will oer higher price discounts. This insight stems from analyzing two
strategic variables instead of keeping one of them constant. Finally, we also nd that
network eects aect post-competition market shares both directly (through favoring the
rm with a larger consumer appeal) and indirectly (through encouraging (discouraging)
advertising for ex-ante advantaged (disadvantaged) rms).
Note that by constraining x0 and x1 on [0; 1], we exclusively considered the case of
ex-ante horizontal product dierentiation. In a model of vertical product dierentiation,
Tremblay and Martins-Filho (2001) show that the rm with the higher quality advertises
more than its rival and charges a higher price. Thus, like in our model, an initial strategic
advantage leads to higher investments in the advertising game. We also focus on untar-
geted advertising which changes all consumers' preferences in the same way. A model
of targeted advertising, where consumers closer to the advertised product experience a
greater increase in reservation value V might generate dierent results similar to Chen
et al. (2009) where the share of `partisan' consumers increases in advertising.
Empirically, our results generate a number of predictions about advertising behavior in
concentrated markets: First, we expect larger rms to advertise more heavily, but charge
higher prices. Following the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), this resembles
a `Fat Cat' eect in an entry game where overinvestment by an incumbent at the rst
stage accommodates entry by committing to less aggressive pricing at the second stage.
While we do not look at incentives for entry here, we nd for the larger rm an equivalent
pattern of tough investment at the advertising stage followed by soft behaviour at the
pricing stage. Second, we nd in our model that in asymmetric markets advertising tends
to exacerbate initial dierences and that this tendency is more pronounced for lower ad-
vertising costs. Thus, if advertising costs dier across markets or time, we would expect
dierent degrees of (ex-post) market concentration due to these dierences in advertising
cost. Regulatory interventions in advertising of controversial goods, e.g. tobacco, might
thus provide researchers with a setting in which to test our prediction that advertising
tends to amplify initial market share dierences. Finally, in a cross-section of industries
with and without network eects, we would expect a more uneven distribution of adver-
tising expenditures (for equal post-competition market share distributions) in network
industries.
Our model uses specic functional forms for the cost and eect of advertising. For
empirical work in particular, the question if the parametrization we used is plausible is
crucial as it will help us identify empirical settings in which our predictions can be tested.
The cost of advertising represents decreasing net returns to advertising, which would seem
plausible in most markets. Further, we restrict advertising eciency to be symmetric
the dominant rm may end up advertising more and charging lower prices given their lower cost.
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across rms for analytical convenience.18 While the qualitative nature of our results
remains unchanged with asymmetric advertising costs, rm eectiveness of advertising
would need to be controlled for in empirical work. More importantly however, advertising
has a pure business-stealing eect in our model. This means that in markets where
advertising raises awareness (and therefore demand) for the product as such our model
would not be appropriate.19 Our model thus applies to mature markets with a largely
xed market size. Note also that in our model advertising works immediately and not via
the building up of brand equity or goodwill. We therefore expect our model to be most
useful when considering short-term advertising campaigns rather than long-term brand
building campaigns (which would also arguably expand the market for the product).
Thus, product-specic rather than rm-wide advertising over a limited time period (e.g.
seasonal campaigns) would be the most appropriate empirical setting in which to test our
model empirically.
6 Concluding Remarks
We considered a simple operationalization of persuasive advertising and analyzed its eect
in a duopoly market where rms dier with respect to their ex ante appeal to consumers.
To our knowledge, we are the rst explicitly consider asymmetric rms' advertising deci-
sions in a Hotelling framework. We showed that for symmetric advertising costs a rm
with an initial advantage increases its lead by investing more in advertising than its rival.
Due to lower advertising incentives, an initially disadvantaged rm, on the other hand,
competes by setting low prices.
For a signicant part of the parameter space, both rms would be better o if adver-
tising was not available, but will advertise to capture market share. It is thus natural to
reect on how rms would act if they decided jointly on the implementation of advertis-
ing. Our results show that when rms set advertising collusively but compete in prices,
the competitive results about market shares and prices are reproduced.
The welfare implications of our model are not straightforward. As it is generally not
clear how to weigh consumers' initial perceptions against their post-advertising prefer-
ences, we can only argue in terms of qualitative results. Anderson et al. (1997) observe
that the social optimum in games of spatial dierentiation is generally reached when ag-
gregate transport costs are minimized. For xed distances and quadratic transport cost
functions, this is given when rms are located symmetrically on the consumer interval.
Instead of making the market more symmetric, however, advertising exacerbates market
asymmetry in our model. Consumers may even switch from the initially closer product if
18In the Appendix we show that rms can compensate a disadvantage in product design by higher
eciency in advertising.
19In a model with both business-stealing and demand-creating advertising Doraszelski and Markovich
(2007) obtain dierent predictions to ours on the eect of market size and advertising eectiveness.
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the whole interval shifts through advertising. Advertising thus has the exact opposite ef-
fect than what would be socially desirable. The reason for the large discrepancy between
the competitive and socially optimal outcomes lies in the assumption that the market
is always covered. Aggregate demand is thus xed and rms attend less to consumer
surplus.
One could argue that our results depend strongly on the assumption of a one-shot
game. For example, as the smaller rm is constrained to this period's budget, it can only
invest as much in advertising as it earns at the product market. In reality, the rm may
build up a savings stock over time or borrow money at the capital market to rectify earlier
strategic choices. On the other hand, if the smaller rm had such an opportunity, so would
the initial leader. It is not clear that the disadvantaged rm could really raise enough
capital to compete head-to-head. In such a situation, the optimal timing of advertising
spending and strategies such as pulsing would denitely become interesting issues to study.
Our extended model suggests that network eects do not change the quality of compe-
tition substantially but strengthen the observed escalating eects of advertising. Clearly,
an empirical investigation of this issue would be of great value for the assessment of the
scope of network eects' impact on competitive outcomes. The theoretical model, on the
other hand, could be extended in a dynamic framework with installed bases that add to
the network size. In such a setting, additional asymmetries in installed bases may shift
more weight to network eects than in the present one-shot game.
One other avenue for future research is a model variant where aggregate demand is
endogenous. In practice, marketers often aim at dierent functions of advertising, mixing
informative and persuasive content. Incorporating informative aspects that determine
the size of the potential market in the model will presumably widen the scope of overall
advertising investments. However, there is no reason for expecting that in this case the
disadvantaged rm could surpass its initially leading rival.
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A Asymmetric cost structure
Consider now the case where advertising technologies dier with respect to their cost
parameters i. The decision problem for rm i at the third stage becomes
max
ai
pi (ai; aj)  ni(pi (ai; aj); pj(ai; aj); ai; aj)  i  a2i :
Prot maximization yields advertising levels
a0 =
N(x1   x0)
3
 31(2 + x0 + x1)  4
2N(x1   x0)
901   2(0 + 1)2N(x1   x0) (28)
and
a1 =
N(x1   x0)
3
 30(4  x0   x1)  4
2N(x1   x0)
901   2(0 + 1)2N(x1   x0) : (29)
Note that the cost asymmetry may result in varying advertising values also for symmetri-
cally located rms. For (28) and (29) to yield prot maxima, we require minimum levels
for advertising cost parameters:
0 >
2
9
2N(x1   x0)
1 >
2
9
2N(x1   x0):
(30)
In addition and analogously to Assumption 1, we make the following assumption about
overall advertising costs:
Assumption 4. Advertising costs satisfy the following inequality:
01
0 + 1
>
2
9
2N(x1   x0)
Assumption 4 states that the sum of advertising costs cannot be too low. It implies
that when one of the rms has very low advertising costs, we require the other to have
relatively high costs. As in the case of Assumption 1, the restrictions to the parameter
space avoid cases in which one rm can prot from shifts of the consumer interval without
sacricing anything.
Equations (28) and (29) show that the initially disadvantaged rm may gain on its rival
when it can advertise at lower costs. The cost dierential necessary for this opportunity
depends on the extent of the initial locational asymmetry. In particular, we have
a0 > (<) a

1 if
1
0
> (<)
4  x0   x1
2 + x0 + x1
:
A rm with a locational disadvantage may thus invest a higher amount in advertising than
28
the initially advantaged rival when the locational asymmetry is counterbalanced by a cost
advantage. When a rm is both advantaged with respect to location and advertising cost,
it will always out-advertise the rival, thus further increasing asymmetries. This leads to
the following proposition:
Proposition 3a. For asymmetric advertising costs, a locational disadvantage can be oset
by a less costly advertising technology so that a rm with an initial disadvantage advertises
more than its rival and shifts the consumer distribution in its favor.
The interior subgame perfect equilibrium is then described by (28) and (29) as well as
p0 = 0(x1   x0)
31(2 + x0 + x1)  42N(x1   x0)
901   2(0 + 1)2N(x1   x0) ; (31)
p1 = 1(x1   x0)
30(4  x0   x1)  42N(x1   x0)
901   2(0 + 1)2N(x1   x0) (32)
and ^ =
1
2
301(2 + x0 + x1)  402N(x1   x0)
901   2(0 + 1)2N(x1   x0) : (33)
Equilibrium prices and market shares depend on the size of the advertising cost parame-
ters. Dierences in the cost of the advertising technology lead to asymmetric pricing and
market outcomes even for symmetric rms. It may even be feasible to oust a locationally
advantaged rm altogether: For
0 <
4
3(4  x0   x1)
2N(x1   x0); (34)
rm 0 can advertise so cheaply that rm 1 can no longer counteract the eect with further
price cuts. As a result, rm 0 captures the entire market. Note that in contrast to the
case with symmetric costs, inequality (36) may also hold for cases where rm 0 is initially
disadvantaged (x0 + x1 < 1). Initial market asymmetries may thus be oset completely
by advertising cost dierentials.
Equilibrium strategies for the parameter range restricted by (34) are
p0 = (x1   x0)
22N(x1   x0)  0(2  x0   x1)
0
; p1 = 0;
a0 =
N(x1   x0)
0
and a1 = 0:
(35)
Analogously, for
1 <
4
3(2 + x0 + x1)
2N(x1   x0); (36)
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rm 1 captures the entire market with
p0 = 0; p

1 = (x1   x0)
22N(x1   x0)  1(x0 + x1)
1
;
a0 = 0 and a

1 =
N(x1   x0)
1
:
(37)
While (34) and (36) do not depend on dierentials but absolute cost levels, joint adver-
tising costs must not be too low. By Assumption 4, own advertising cost that are so low
that a disadvantaged rm is apt to monopolize the market require the rival's cost to be
relatively high. The following proposition restates what was shown above:
Proposition 3b. When its own advertising costs are very low, a rm that was initially
disadvantaged can even capture the whole market.
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Figure 4: The eect of locational advantage and advertising costs on monopoly outcomes
for asymmetric advertising cost (x1 = 0:75, 1 = 0:5, N = 1,  = 1,  = 0:8).
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between initial locational asymmetry and cost
asymmetry with regard to market outcomes: Values on the horizontal axis represent rm
0's position on the Hotelling line. Firm 0's advertising cost parameter 0 is depicted on
the vertical axis. Its relation to the xed cost parameter of rm 1, 1, embodies the
cost asymmetry. Again, area (1) indicates parameterizations for which rms share the
market. For parameterizations in area (2), rm 0 captures the entire market. For other
parameterizations joint advertising costs are too low so that they are excluded because of
Assumption 4.
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We can see from Figure 4 that when rm 0 is located far from rm 1, the cost dier-
ential required for complete market capture is smaller than when rms are located more
closely to each other. Put dierently, the closer rm 0 is located to rm 1, the lower its
advertising costs must be in order to be able to capture the entire market. The intuition
behind this observation is that when rms' products are located closely to each other they
look similar from a consumer's point of view. It is thus more dicult to displace the other
rm as consumers who have preferences close to one brand do not need to travel far in
order to buy the other product. By contrast, when rms are located far from each other,
a smaller advertising investment is needed to make the own rm appealing and the other
rm unattractive to a large share of consumers. In other words, advertising's eects are
less extreme when rms are located closely to each other.
Note also how the notion of locational advantage becomes negligible in this setting:
Firm 0 can capture the market even when it is initially disadvantaged (x0 < 0:25) while
the area of market capture shrinks with increasing locational advantage.
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